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SECTION 419 OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION
ACT: WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT ON AIR
SERVICE TO SMALL COMMUNITIES?
JAMES S. MEYER
T HE AIRLINE DEREGULATION Act of 1978 (the ADA)'
instituted substantial changes in government regulation of
the airline industry. The main thrust of the ADA is to limit
severely government regulation and place "maximum reliance
on competitive market forces and on actual and potential
competition .... " The ADA is a product of extensive polit-
ical debate.3 One of the most controversial issues was whether
there would be an adverse impact on air service to small com-
munities.4 In order to insure that a comprehensive and conve-
nient system of continuous scheduled air service for small
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-02,
1305-08, 1324, 1341, 1371-73, 1374, 1376, 1378-82, 1386, 1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482,
1490-1504) (West Supp. 1981).
* 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(4) (West Supp. 1981).
3 See generally Regulatory Reform in Air Transp.: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Aviation Regulatory Reform
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transp., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air
Carriers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transp., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
4 For analyses predicting the economic impact of deregulation on the airlines, and
in turn the air service they would subsequently provide, see generally AMERICAN EN-
TERPRISE INSTITUTE, REGULATION AND PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG THE
AIRLINES (1977) [hereinafter cited as AEI]; Dupre, A Thinking Person's Guide to En-
try/Exit Deregulation in the Airline Industry, 9 TRANSP. L.J. 273 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Dupre]; Thayer, And Now "The Deregulators": When Will They Learn? 43
J. AIR L. & CoM. 661 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Thayer]; Brenner, Need for Contin-
ued Economic Regulation of Air Transportation, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 793 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brenner].
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communities and isolated areas5 would be maintained, Con-
gress in section 419 of the ADA' guaranteed "essential air
transportation' to all "eligible points" for a period of ten
years.' To accomplish this goal, Congress, among other
things,10 created a new federal subsidy program to compensate
qualifying air carriers.1"
The small community program established in section 419
has been in effect since October of 1978."s All initial, essential
air transportation determinations18 have been made for the
communities guaranteed service under section 419,1" and gov-
ernment subsidization, where necessary, has also been initi-
' 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a)(8) (West Supp. 1981).
Id. § 1389.
7 Id. § 1389(f).
"[Essential air transportation" means scheduled air transportation
of persons to a point provided under such criteria as the Board deter-
mines satisfies the needs of the community concerned for air transpor-
tation to one or more communities of interest and insures access to the
Nation's air transportation system, at rates, fares, and charges which
are not unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferen-
tial or unduly prejudicial ....
Id.
The guidelines that the CAB adopted for making "essential air transportation" deter-
minations are set out in 14 C.F.R. § 398 (1981).
' For a community to be guaranteed essential air service as an "eligible point" it
must fit within the terms of 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981), or qualify as
an additional "eligible point" under the guidelines of 14 C.F.R. § 270 (1981) which
were established by the Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(b)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1981).
: The small community program "shall cease to be in effect after the last day of
the ten-year period which begins Oct. 24, 1978." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(g) (West Supp.
1981).
'o The section 406 subsidy program which originally was instituted to subsidize the
transfer of mail, but later primarily supported small town service, is to be phased out
and terminated on January 1, 1986. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1376(c) (West Supp. 1981).
" 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(4)-(11) (West Supp. 1981). See notes 95-102 and accompa-
nying text infra.
12 Eligibility for the program began on October 24, 1978. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)
(West Supp. 1981).
" For an explanation of the guidelines used in determining essential air transpor-
tation see notes 56-70 and accompanying text infra.
" Although the statutory deadline for the initial essential service determinations
by the Board was October 24, 1979, the process was not completed until several
months later due purportedly to "the Board's thoroughness in gathering community
views and reviewing policy" and not any lack of effort. Av. DAILY, Nov. 5, 1979, at 18.
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ated.' 5 Furthermore, the forces of the open market have now
had an opportunity to take effect.
This comment addresses the questions regarding whether
the section 419 small community program is working to sat-
isfy the needs of the communities concerned, and whether
those needs will call for future government regulation beyond
the ten years stipulated in the ADA. 6 Economic predictions
which were advanced by airline economists, executives and
other industry analysts prior to deregulation are set forth
before an examination of the statutory framework of section
419. There is also an evaluation of the effect deregulation and
section 419 have had on air service in many small communi-
ties. Finally, a conclusion will be reached as to the future ac-
tion required to insure that small communities receive essen-
tial air service.
I. Opposing Economic Theories on Deregulation
Whether government regulation or a basic reliance on the
free market is the proper method for achieving the goals of
the air transportation system 17 has been a subject of great dis-
" Government subsidies under Section 419 of the ADA are estimated to be $9.4
million for 1980. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 12, 1980, at 22.
"0 See note 9 supra.
" The goals of the United States air transportation system as dictated by public
interest are stated in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West Supp. 1981):
(1) The assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest prior-
ity in air commerce ...
(2) The prevention of any deterioration in established safety proce-
dures ...
(3) The availability of a variety of adequate economic, efficient and
low priced services by air carriers and foreign air carriers without un-
just discriminations . . . the need to improve relations among, and co-
ordinate transportation by, air carriers ...
(4) ... (A) to provide the needed air transportation system and
(B) to encourage efficient and well managed carriers to earn adequate
profits and to attract capital.
(5) The development and maintenance of a sound regulatory envi-
ronment which is responsive to the needs of the public and in which
decisions are reached promptly in order to facilitate adoption of the
air transportation system to the present and future needs of the do-
mestic and foreign commerce of the United States, the Postal Service
and the national defense.
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pute. Those opposing deregulation predicted an adverse effect
on air service to small communities. 8 The typical scenerio set
forth by opponents of deregulation was that, in a totally un-
regulated market, airlines would actively compete for the
more profitable routes primarily by reducing air fares.1 9 No
carrier would allow fares to be undercut for fear of losing pas-
sengers to its competitors.2 0 Therefore, fares would spiral
downward as each airline attempted to gain a competitive ad-
vantage. Ultimately, this cutthroat competition would cause
all carriers to charge fares below their operating costs,2 1 and
(6) The encouragement of air service at major urban areas in the
United States through secondary or satellite airports. . . and fostering
an environment which reasonably enables such carriers to establish
themselves and to develop their secondary or satellite airport services.
(7) . . . the avoidance of. . . conditions, that would tend to allow
one or more air carriers unreasonably to increase prices, reduce ser-
vices, or exclude competition in air transportation.
(8) The maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of
continuous sched.led airline service for small communities and iso-
lated areas...
(9) The encouragement of entry into air transportation markets by
new air carriers, . . . existing air carriers, and the continued strength-
ening of small air carriers so as to assure a more effective, competitive
airline industry.
Id.
'0 See generally AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, AIR TRANSPORTATION REGULA-
TORY REFORM, 15-21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AEI Analysis].
19 Id. at 20. Competition in a regulated market is limited to improvements in ser-
vice quality; for example, more frequent flights by the same airline, more comfortable
aircraft and better meals. Id. at 15. An increase in the number of airlines serving the
more profitable routes in a deregulated market would lead to excess capacity, and the
competition to fill that capacity would be in the form of lower fares. See Dupre,
supra note 4, at 281.
10 See AEI Analysis, supra note 18, at 20.
"' See Dupre, supra note 4, at 280-81. Direct operating costs consist of expenses
that vary according to factors such as the number of passengers aboard each flight,
the number of flights and the length of each flight. See G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER,
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY 13-18 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS & MILLER]. These costs include expenses such as fuel
costs, crew pay, landing fees, passenger service costs and aircraft maintenance. See
Brenner, supra note 4, at 799. Fixed costs on the other hand, are costs .that-will be
incurred no matter how many flights the airline makes. These expenses are costs in-
curred in purchasing or leasing aircraft and non-flight equipment such as a computer-
ized reservation system, rental expenditures at airports and most general and admin-
istrative expenses. Id. at 798. See also Dupre, supra note 4, at 280-81. The theory is
that during fierce competition, airlines will reduce fares to their direct operating cost
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to suffer financial losses. This chain of events would be detri-
mental to the entire air transportation network.2
The opponents of deregulation further argued that the
above scenario could be the result of an aggressive carrier in-
tentionally instigating such a price war as a predatory tactic.2
By causing its competitors to incur losses, the aggressor air-
line could force the other competing airlines to abandon cer-
tain routes or drive them into bankruptcy.24 The aggressor
airline, with financial reserves to weather such losses, might
then be able to establish a monopoly on the more lucrative
routes or remain a member of a small group of larger airlines
level or below for each flight, leaving no return available on the airline's fixed costs.
An inability to provide a return on fixed costs would lead the airlines to lease or sell
their aircraft, suspend operations entirely on some routes and lay off employees. Id.
at 281.
2 See generally AEI Analysis, supra note 18, at 15-21. In reducing costs in order
to maintain profitability, some opponents of deregulation argued that the airlines
might skimp on aircraft maintenance and safety margins. William Mahoney, counsel
to the Air Line Pilots Association, stated that:
But employees know the effects upon safety of carrier employers hav-
ing to cut corners in order to survive, as for example in the astounding
number of train derailments throughout the United States. Every in-
stinct tells us that the rail safety record will be repeated in the air
transport industry as air carriers feel compelled to cut corners in order
to stay in business.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1286.
23 AEI Analysis, supra note 18, at 20. Predatory pricing occurs when one or several
of the stronger firms in an industry lower prices in order to drive the weaker firms
that cannot withstand losses for a long period of time into bankruptcy, thereby re-
ducing competition. Gerald O'Grady, senior vice president-legal of Western Airlines,
stated that:
We object to carriers being given discretion to increase or decrease
fares or rates in individual markets subject only to the restriction that
such rates or fares shall not fall below "direct costs".... This provi-
sion in effect authorizes the carriers to engage in rate wars in individ-
ual markets, with the one which can best afford to lose money being
ultimately sucessful in driving competitors out of the market. . . . The
small carrier under this form of regulation does not stand a chance.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 1374, 1382. These pricing tactics are only sensible
if a competitor, once driven out of a market cannot reenter it. This assumes that
economies of scale exist within the airline industry providing the larger carriers with
lower per-passenger costs. See G. EADs, THE LocAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT 72-
74 (1972) (hereinafter cited as EADS]. But see notes 35-38 and accompanying text
infra.
', See Dupre, supra note 4, at 280 n.44.
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serving such routes.2 5
The pro-regulators argued that smaller communities would
lose air service because the large airlines subsidize their ser-
vice to small communities with profits from their more profit-
able routes.2 6 With income reduced on their normally profita-
ble routes due to the increased competition resulting from
deregulation, airlines would abandon their service to smaller
communities, thus shrinking the national air transportation
system.
Some of the most vocal proponents of continued regulation
have been the trunklines which have dominated the airline in-
dustry prior to deregulation. 8 Their analyses showed a large
number of routes which were unprofitable but were served
without federal subsidy 29 due to cross-subsidies from other
profitable segments.30 The trunklines further argued that the
airline industry does not conform to the traditional concepts
of classical economics.3 They contended that a total market
25 See AEI Analysis, supra note 18, at 20. After driving the small carriers out of
the lucrative markets, the large firms would then establish monopolies or oligopolies
on such routes and charge excessive fares. Id. See also Thayer, supra note 4, at 668.
26 See AEI, supra note 4, at 82 n.4. The notion is that air carriers voluntarily serve
unprofitable markets in recognition of public service objectives. With deregulation,
competition would dry up the profits being earned on the denser routes eliminating
any cross-subsidies. This would result in the elimination of any large carrier's ability
to subsidize a smaller unprofitable market. Id. But see note 39 infra.
Dupre, supra note 4, at 281.
Id. at 283-88.
19 Any subsidy for service to small communities prior to deregulation would have
come from the section 406 subsidy program now codified in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1376 (West
Supp. 1979). The section 406 subsidy program based an airline's subsidy on that air-
line's system-wide operating costs in relation to its revenues. The program was not
very effective in the decade prior to the ADA as 128 towns were dropped from certifi-
cated service during that time. See Comment, Commuter Airlines and the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, 45 J. AiR L. & CoM. 685, 694-95 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Commuter Airlines]. See note 10 supra.
30 See Dupre, supra note 4, at 285. Eastern Airlines claimed to have 160 domestic
routes that were benefitting from cross-subsidies, all of which could be in jeopardy
under deregulation :* Id.
" See Brenner, supra note 4, at 794, 800. Under classic economic theories, factors
of supply and demand interact in a manner to produce a self-adjusting equilibrium.
The airline industry has a built-in tendancy towards over-capacity and that tendency
would be greatly intensified under deregulation. This capacity behavior cannot be
reconciled with classical theories of supply and demand. In any other industry, it
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planning approach with the CAB as coordinator, would pro-
vide much more stable and efficient service than an unregu-
lated market in which every individual air carrier would be
completely free to do its own individual planning regarding
routes and fares.82 The advocates of regulation saw no need to
change a system which they felt was already operating in the
public's best interest."
The supporters of deregulation, on the other hand, believed
that the increased competition of a free market in the airline
industry would be in the best interests of the public. They
argued that deregulation would not be detrimental to small
community service if a lesser amount of remaining regulation
were properly structured taking into consideration the legiti-
mate demands and needs of industry, labor, management and
consumers. 4 They argued that predatory pricing would be im-
possible under airline deregulation because such pricing tac-
tics by larger airlines are only sensible if a competitor, once
driven out of the market, would not reenter it.8 ' Since jet air-
craft have been among the most mobile investments in mod-
ern industry, proponents of deregulation argued that carriers
could always enter new markets at will, thereby preventing
would be unthinkable for a firm that had been selling only one-third of its output to
then increase its rate of output by over thirty percent. Id.
See Thayer, supra note 4, at 672.
" See Tillinghast, The Practicalities of Deregulation, 45 ANTrRUST L.J. 236, 243
(1976).
34 See 124 CONG. REc. S5856 (daily ed. April 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
35 Id. Donald Baker, former assistant attorney general for the antitrust division
testified that:
We believe the key to preventing predatory behavior is not regulatory
control of fares, but a policy of liberal entry and pricing. . . . More-
over, the "natural monopoly" argument, which some advance to justify
economic regulation finds no support in the facts of air transportation
economics. The larger air carriers do not enjoy "economies of scale";
that is, any cost advantages the largest air carriers nhay enjoy because
of their large size are more than offset by the increased costs and in-
flexibilities of managing a large complex and dynamic airline system.
In addition, the most costly air carrier assets are much more highly
mobile than the key assets of, for instance, oil pipelines or electrical
generating plants.
Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 571-72. Predatory pricing is specifically prohibited
by the ADA. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(35) (West Supp. 1981).
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the predator from subsequently raising its prices.3 6 This view
of the deregulators was premised on the belief that no econo-
mies of scale37 of any importance existed in the airline indus-
try to prevent smaller carriers from effectively competing.3 8
The notion that service to many communities was cross-
subsidized by the airlines' more profitable routes was criti-
cized as being highly unlikely in light of the main goal of all
corporations to maximize profits."9 Indeed it was stated by
some advocates of deregulation that the cross-subsidy argu-
ment used by the larger airlines was nothing more than a
"smokescreen" disguising the true effect that regulation had
on the airline industry's profit picture. That effect, it was ar-
gued, was to cause minimal losses in the smaller markets
while creating windfalls due to the protection of regulation in
the more lucrative markets. 40 Advocates of deregulation fur-
ther contended that the old certificate"1 and subsidy pro-
30 See 124 CONG. REc. S5856 (daily ed. April 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
"7 For a definition of "economies of scale" see note 35 supra.
30 See AEI Analysis, supra note 18, at 19-20. See also 124 CONG. REc. S5856 (daily
ed. April 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy). Examples were given as to how smaller
carriers have competed successfully with larger airlines demonstrating that the larger
an airline becomes does not necessarily make the airline more cost efficient. Laker
Airways has had great success in the New York to London market, in fact undercut-
ting the larger carriers by hundreds of dollars. Id. North Central, another small car-
rier, forced United Airlines out of the non-stop Milwaukee-New York market, and
Ozark had similar success competing with American Airlines in the Chicago-St. Louis
market. Id.
39 AEI supra note 4, at 82 n.4.
Although the management of an airline might like to view the airline
as a public service organization, it would face severe pressures not to
operate in such a manner. It must withstand comparisons with other
airlines, and the airline which is most profitable (rather than the one
which serves the most losing routes) will be most favorably judged.
Thus, management in the airline industry, as in any other industry,
faces great pressure [mainly from investors wanting a better return on
their dollar] to .cut losses and increase profits. Although an industry
composed of very profitable firms may afford the luxury of consciously
maintaining losing operations, it seems doubtful that the airline indus-
try is in a condition to do so. These factors lead us to believe that
airlines do not generally and gladly subsidize losing service with profits
earned elsewhere in their system.
Id.
10 Dupre, supra note 4, at 284.
" See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (West Supp. 1981).
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gram42 had not been very successful in protecting air service
to small markets, because the certificate did not guarantee
service to any particular markets." One study advocating der-
egulation compiled statistics indicating that the trunk air car-
riers had already terminated service to most of their marginal
points by the mid-1970s." Therefore, deregulation would sim-
ply accelerate the trend already begun toward service to small
communities by commuter as opposed to local service
carriers.45
II. Section 419 and Small Community Air Service
Though the opponents and supporters of deregulation dif-
fered as to its long range effects, most factions recognized that
deregulation initially would have an adverse effect on air ser-
vice to small communities.4 Congressmen representing less
densely populated regions were particularly concerned that
complete deregulation would lead to a substantial abandon-
ment of air service to their constituents.4 7 In order to mini-
mize this impact on the smaller markets, Congress amended
the ADA to include section 419, 48 which guarantees "essential
air transportation" to certain smaller communities for ten
years.4' The regulation of air carrier exit from these communi-
12 See notes 10 & 29 supra for a discussion of the section 406 subsidy program.
43 See AEI, supra note 4, at 98. Community protests under the old system only
delayed for several years the eventual suspension or deletion of service by the certi-
fied carrier if they were intent on reducing service. Id.
44 Id.
5 Id. "In years prior to deregulation, commuter airlines prospered while other car-
riers languished. Though only a handful of commuter type airlines existed originally,
a total of 208 carriers offered passenger service in 1978." Commuter Airlines, supra
note 29, at 692. See also Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 77-78.
'6 The larger airlines argued that loss of cross-subsidies due to fierce price competi-
tion would lead to abandonment of smaller markets. See notes 26-30 and accompany-
ing text supra. Some of their opponents contended that an abandonment had already
begun and would merely be accelerated by deregulation. See notes 39-45 and accom-
panying text supra.
4 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S5863, (daily ed. April 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
McGovern).
48 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389 (West Supp. 1981).
'" CONF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3737, 3798.
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ties8" and a special subsidy program designed to insure that
some service is provided to these smaller communities imple-
ments this ten year guarantee.5 1
The essential service determinations for each eligible point
under the small community air service program are made pur-
suant to guidelines adopted by the CAB in accordance with its
rulemaking power.2 The guidelines are intended to be used
by the CAB in a flexible manner to insure that each commu-
nity is analyzed on an individual basis.53 In determining the
essential air service to be provided under the guidelines, the
relevant inquiry is what level of service the government
should guarantee to insure the community's access to other
communities of interest and the national air system." This
level of service, however, is not necessarily the level of service
that the community wants. 5
The guidelines for individual determinations of essential air
transportation are based on several factors: the number and
designation of hubs, the specifications of airports and equip-
ment, the frequency and times of flights, the maximum avail-
able capacity to be guaranteed by the CAB, and the number
of stops permitted 6 The essential service determinations are
set forth in terms of service to one or two hubs per day" in
order to insure convenient and reasonable access for an eligi-
ble point to its major destinations either with direct service or
The conference ... [amendment for Section 419] guarantees contin-
ued air transportation for 10 years to all cities which are listed on air
carrier certificates on the date of enactment, including cities at which
a certified carrier has suspended service. To insure such service the
substitute establishes a new subsidy program, with compensation to be
based on the needs of the community and the use of appropriate size
aircraft.
Id.
50 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(3), (b) (West Supp. 1981).
" Id. § 1389(a)(4), (5), (7)-(11).




" 14 C.F.R. § 398 (1981).
" Id. § 398.2(a).
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convenient connecting opportunities. 8 The factors the Board
looks at in determining which hubs to serve are: the extent to
which the hubs are linked to the national air transportation
system, the commercial, geographic, and political ties of the
hubs to the eligible point, the traffic levels at the hubs, the
distance between the hubs and the eligible point, and the size
of the hubs. 9 Essential service under the guidelines does not
usually require that the essential service be to a particular air-
port at the hub, but it may require service to a particular air-
port at the eligible point."'
No specific type or size of aircraft is required by the guide-
lines, but the aircraft must meet the applicable FAA safety
standards,"1 must have two engines, be operated by two pilots,
and be sufficient to accommodate the passengers and their
baggage at the eligible point.62 The frequency of flights re-
quired under the guidelines is "at least two round-trip flights
on each weekday and two round-trips over the weekend from
the eligible point to the designated hub, unless the point was
receiving less service in 1977 and cannot support such service
at a 50 percent average load factor."' 8 This level of service can
58 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,649 (1979). The general rule of the CAB is to require
service to only one hub, but where there are commercial, geographic, and political ties
in two directions ansi sufficient traffic to support two round trips per day to both
hubs, the CAB will consider defining the essential level in terms of service to two
hubs from the small community. Id. at 52,648-49. If traffic is not sufficient, the CAB
may require one round trip per day to both hubs if the community requests such
service. 14 C.F.R. § 398.2(b)(1) (1981).
5- 14 C.F.R. § 398.2(c) (1981).
00 Id. § 398.3(a). In the case of eligible points which are hyphenated (two small
communities considered jointly), essential air service will be specified as service to
more than one airport only if clearly necessary and if multi-airport service is econom-
ically feasible and justified on the basis of traffic levels at these airports. Id.
6, Id. § 398.4. For the FAA safety standards see 14 C.F.R. § 121 (1981) which cov-
ers aircraft seating over thirty passengers, and see 14 C.F.R. § 135 (1981) which cov-
ers planes flown by some commuter carriers that seat less than thirty passengers.
6, 14 C.F.R. § 398.4 (1981). The two engine, two pilot requirement may be relaxed
by the small community receiving the essential services determination if they so de-
sire. Id. See 44 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (1979). Pressurized and air-conditioned aircraft will
be required when absolutely necessary to provide usable air service to the eligible
points. 14 C.F.R. § 398.4(e) (1981).
63 14 C.F.R. § 398.5(a) (1981). Average load factor is defined as the ratio of passen-
1981]
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be increased if historic traffic data indicates a need for more
frequent flights or if smaller aircraft are being used, requiring
more trips."' If traffic levels change with the season, a two-tier
level of air service will be instigated to meet the varying needs
of the eligible point.6" The guidelines are very flexible as to
the required departure time of flights. Flights merely have to
depart at reasonable times, and if travel is primarily local,
there needs to be at least one flight in the morning and one in
the late afternoon or evening. e6
Only under unusual circumstances will the maximum avail-
able flight capacity that the Board guarantees to any eligible
point be in excess of 120 available seats; that is 60 seats in
each direction. 7 This capacity can be increased in certain cir-
cumstances, such as when the eligible point is virtually iso-
lated or when the number of stops between the eligible point
and the hub to which it has been guaranteed service are such
that the available aircraft capacity is being shared with those
intermediate boarding passengers. 68 "A maximum of two stops
is permitted in providing essential air service between the eli-
gible point and a hub, unless otherwise agreed with the com-
munity."69 Under the Board's discretion, they may require
one-stop or non-stop service when it is necessary to make the
gers carried to available seats. DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 21, at 13. In Alaska, it
is the policy of the Board to require either two round trips each week to each desig-
nated hub or focal point or the level of service that existed for the point in 1976,
whichever is greater, unless such service is clearly unnecessary and the Alaska Trans-
portation Commission agrees that a different level of service would meet the needs of
the community. 14 C.F.R. § 398.5(b) (1981).
14 C.F.R. § 398.5(c) (1981).
Id. § 398.5(d). This situation might arise in communities which serve as seasonal
vacation spots. A two-tier system would allow for adequate transportation during the
vacation season while lowering the number of flights during the off season when tour-
ist travel is at a low.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,653 (1979). "Timing and scheduling requirements that
are too specific will hinder rather than assist the development of viable and respon-
sive air transportation. . . .Connecting banks at various hubs are at different times
of the day depending upon the specific carriers serving the hub city and their service
patterns." Id.
" 14 C.F.R. § 398.6(a) (1981).
u Id. § 398.6(b).
I9 d. § 398.8(a).
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service effective. 0
The procedures adopted by the Board to be used in making
these essential air service determinations are very informal to
insure maximum public participation.7 ' The Board encourages
input from local and state government, airport supervisors,
and any other interested party to help it in the determination
of essential service. 7 These determinations are appealable by
any person within 60 days after issuance. An appeal must con-
tain specific objections to the determination, a statement of
the extraordinary factors justifying a deviation from the
guidelines, and a description of the desired level of essential
air service.7' All appeals are considered by a panel of three
CAB employees: one from the Bureau of Domestic Aviation, 4
one from the Office of Community and Congressional Rela-
tions,75 and one from the Office of General Counsel.7'6 The es-
sential air service determinations are further subject to
change through a petition for modification which can be filed
by any person," or through the periodic review of the deter-
minations required by the essential air service procedures. 78
70 Id. § 398.8(c). "When an eligible point normally is an intermediate stop that
shares available capacity with another point, it is the policy of the Board to either
require additional capacity (more flights or larger aircraft) between the hub and the
eligible point or to specify some turnaround operations in that route segment. Id.
§ 398.8(d).
71 See 44 Fed. Reg. 52,661, 52,664 (1979). Under the regulations, communities and
members of the public have numerous opportunities to make their views known to
the Board. Any interested person can appeal an essential service determination and
either by written comment, informal hearing or oral argument the Board will become
aware of such person's views. Id.
7' See 14 C.F.R. § 325.4 (1981).
73 Id. § 325.7.
"' 44 Fed. Reg. 52,661, 52,664 (1979). The Bureau of Domestic Aviation is the
branch of the CAB directly in charge of the determination and issuance of essential
services to all of the eligible communities. Id.
75 The Office of Community and Congressional Relations is involved in monitoring
the essential service at eligible points and serves as a liason in the field for the CAB.
Id.
71 This three-member panel can make a direct recommendation to the Board or
call for an informal conference if the appeal raises an issue that cannot be resolved on
the basis of written submissions. 14 C.F.R. § 325.8 (1981).
77 Id. § 325.10.
78 Id. § 325.6. "The Board will start a periodic review of essential air service within
one year of the date of the previous determination of essential air service for eligible
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In the continental United States there are several standards
under which communities may be eligible for essential air ser-
vice determinations. First, any point receiving certificated ser-
vice on October 24, 1978, automatically qualifies for an essen-
tial service determination." Second, the group of communities
that were deleted from an air carrier's certificated service be-
tween July 1, 1968, and October 24, 1978, will be eligible if
they meet certain criteria set forth by the Board." The group
of communities that lost all certificated air service at their air-
ports as a result of hyphenation"' with another community on
a carrier's certificate between July 1, 1968, and October 24,
1978, may be eligible as well.'2 The CAB is required by section
419 to weigh specific considerations in compiling criteria for
determining communities' eligibility for essential air service
such as historic and potential traffic levels, probability and
cost of subsidy, alternative means of transportation and the
isolation of the community." The criteria the CAB promul-
gated for determining eligibility mainly focuses on the isola-
tion and the potential traffic generated by the community.84
Communities located less than thirty road miles from a hub
airport are not eligible."5 Communities between thirty and
sixty road miles from a hub airport will be designated eligible
if they have the potential of enplaning twenty passengers each
day for five days of the week. 8" Communities over sixty road
miles from a hub airport will be designated eligible for essen-
tial service if they have the potential of enplaning ten passen-
points receiving subsidized service. . . and within three years of the date of the pre-
vious determination for eligible points without subsidized air service. Id.
1' 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
50 14 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1981).
81 See note 60 supra for a definition of hyphenated points.
82 14 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1981). Any other communities in Alaska and Hawaii can apply
for designation as an eligible point. Id. The criteria for the communities in Alaska
and Hawaii is set out in subpart C of the regulations. Id. §§ 270.20-.21.
88 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
44 Fed. Reg. 59,242-44 (1979).
" 14 C.F.R. § 270.10 (1981) "The isolation of a community will be evaluated by
measuring the driving distance from its center to the nearby hub's airport or to an
eligible point's airport." Id. § 270.4.
" Id. § 270.11(a).
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gers each day for five days of the week.'8 After the CAB com-
pletes its determination of eligible points not automatically
qualifying for guaranteed service, the Board has until January
1, 1982, to complete the essential service determinations for
these communities."
Route exit from these small communities is regulated under
section 419 by requiring any certiffed or subsidized carrier to
give ninety days' notice to the Board, the appropriate state
agencies, and the affected communities prior to any termina-
tion, suspension or reduction of service to such points.89 Non-
certified, non-subsidized carriers such as some commuter air-
lines, are only required to give thirty days' notice to the ap-
propriate parties.90 The Board will allow route exit unless the
remaining service to the eligible point will drop below the
level previously determined to be essential.'1 In such a situa-
tion, the carrier seeking to reduce or abandon service will be
required by the Board to continue providing essential service
to the eligible point for subsequent thirty-day periods, until a
substitute carrier is found." When a carrier is required to stay
past the notice period and provide essential service, it is com-
pensated by the Board for any losses incurred in compliance
during that period while the Board is looking for a replace-
ment carrier.93
When the Board requires a carrier to hold over past its no-
tice period for abandonment, "it is to make every effort to se-
87 Id. § 270.11(b).
1- 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1981).
89 Id. § 1389(a)(3)(A). Under the prior law a certified carrier could only abandon a
route if the Board found it to be in the public interest. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371(j) (1976).
90 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1981).
Id. § 1389(a)(6).
'. Id. See Frontier Airlines, Inc., v. C.A.B., 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980). Frontier
was ordered by the CAB to provide essential service for two communities in New
Mexico for several thirty day periods until a replacement carrier, Zia Airlines, took
over those routes. After Zia began service, Frontier still had to provide back-up ser-
vice for an additional period of sixty days. These orders were held to be within the
CAB's statutory power under section 419. Id.
93 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(7) (West Supp. 1981). Any carrier seeking to abandon its
service that was receiving a subsidy will continue to receive their subsidy during the
holdover period. Id. § 1389(a)(7)(A). Trunk carriers can only be compensated for one
year after their initial ninety-day notice period. Id. § 1389(a)(7)(B).
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cure an air carrier to provide at least essential air transporta-
tion to such eligible point on a continuing basis. 'e4 When it is
determined that such essential service cannot be provided to
an eligible point without compensation, the Board is to pro-
vide notice and take applications from carriers willing to pro-
vide service under the section 419 subsidy program.98 Two
factors the Board is to consider in choosing applicants for
subsidy are "the desirability of developing an integrated lin-
ear system of air transportation whenever such a system most
adequately meets the air transportation needs of the commu-
nities involved"" and "the experience of the applicant in pro-
viding scheduled air service in the vicinity of the communities
for which essential air transportation is proposed to be pro-
vided.""" Subsidy payments are to be based on a reasonable
rate of compensation," but are only to be paid so long as they
are necessary to insure the essential service.99 After January 1,
1983, any air carrier can file an application with the CAB
seeking to take over the subsidized service to any eligible
point.'00 The Board shall terminate the subsidy to the carrier
then serving the point and grant a different subsidy to the
new applying carrier if, after notice and hearing, the new car-
rier can prove that its service will result in an improvement in
Id. § 1389(a)(9).
Id. § 1389(a)(4)(A).
Id. § 1389(a)(4)(A)(i). An integrated linear system would tend to connect the
small community with major air centers, stopping at some smaller points in between.
This is the type of service usually provided by local service carriers. See Commuter
Airlines, supra note 29, at 703.
- 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(4)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1981). Local service carriers are gen-
erally presumed to be more experienced than commuter air carriers. See EADS, supra
note 23, at 3-5.
98 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(d) (West Supp. 1981). The guidelines used to determine a
reasonable rate of compensation shall include "expense elements based upon repre-
sentative costs of air carriers providing scheduled air transportation of persons, prop-
erty, and mail, using aircraft of the type determined by the Board to be appropriate
for providing essential air transportation to the eligible point." Id. For an argument
that, in most situations, commuter carriers will provide the most appropriate air ser-
vice to meet the market demands of the eligible small community see Commuter Air-
lines, supra note 29, at 703.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(5) (West Supp. 1981).
100 Id. § 1389(a)(11)(A).
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the air service being provided such eligible point and a de-
crease in the amount of subsidy required to continue essential
air transportation to the point.101 In acting on the applica-
tions, the Board is to "solicit and give great weight to the
opinions of the communities affected by the proposed replace-
ment of an air carrier. "102
III. The Impact On Small Community Service
The implementation of deregulation has had the immediate
effect of changing the service and route structures of the na-
tion's air transportation system. Regional airlines quickly
moved into competition against the trunk airlines in the more
profitable long-haul markets,103 abandoning in the process
many small and medium-sized communities.1 04 Air-taxi opera-
tors and commuter airlines have attempted to fill this void
through the adoption of a hub and spoke concept,105 flying
scheduled routes primarily between these small communities
and hubs.106 Although this approach increases the overall effi-
ciency of the service actually being provided by the smaller
carriers,"' it cannot totally counteract the detrimental effects
on air service caused by a decrease in the number of seats on
departing flights 08 and the diminished quality of service
101 Id.
101 Id. § 1389(a)(11)(C).
100 See EADS, supra note 23, at 74. "[T]he only way to remove the cost disadvan-
tage of local service carriers is to turn them into trunkline carriers-to drop their
short haul low density routes." Id.
'04 Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 77. The irony in their abandonment of service to
small cities is that the regionals got their biggest boost 20 years ago when the trunk
airlines found they could no longer afford to fly to numerous medium sized cities with
their then new jet planes. Id.
105 A hub and spoke flight system involves commuter airlines making direct flights
connecting a major air center with the surrounding small communities. See Com-
muter Airlines, supra note 29, at 690.
100 See Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 78.
107 The CAB argues that a decrease in service between non-hubs is a positive shift
because it shows that passengers have to go from one small airport to another less
frequently before finally reaching their connecting city. Impact of.Airline Deregula-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. VI (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Deregulation Hearings].
10" The Airport Operators Council International's statistical information indicates
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
which has been experienced by many smaller communities.'0e
The CAB contends that many small communities, although
upset at first with the loss of larger aircraft, have generally
come to prefer the replacement commuter services." 0 The
Board further contends that the smaller aircraft are providing
more efficient service to the smaller markets"' as evidenced
by increases in flight frequency and decreases in fuel con-
sumption."' According to CAB Chairman, Marvin Cohen, the
that U.S. airports recorded fewer departures in 1979 than 1978 and that the percent-
age loss of seats is considerably greater. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 21, 1980, at
25.
I' See notes 136-147 and accompanying text infra. Factors which subjectively af-
fect whether or not each passenger feels he or she is receiving quality air service in-
clude lack of pressurization in some commuter planes, cramped interior head and leg
room, more turbulence due to flights at lower altitudes, lack of amenities and flight
attendants, less convenient flight times, aircraft dependability problems, and a gen-
eral feeling that the smaller commuter planes are less safe. Id.
110 The response of these communities is rather interesting. At first many
of them were quite upset about the loss of larger aircraft-fifty seats
or more-service by a certified carrier. Yet these communities soon
discovered that a schedule of four to six or more roundtrips a day with
a fifteen seat aircraft is far preferable to two roundtrips with a fifty
seat plane. I have heard time and time again in my recent travels
around the country to study small community service how pleased
communities such as Waco, Texas, Fredrick, Maryland, and Salem,
Oregon, have been with replacement service. In twenty-five of thirty-
seven small communities studied last year by the Board's staff, passen-
ger traffic improved considerably when a commuter with frequent ser-
vice replaced a local service airline.
Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation: A Study in Transition, 44 J. Am L. &
Com. 695, 699-700 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A Study in Transition].
"' See M. Cohen, Airline Deregulation-It's Working (Oct. 24, 1980) (printed by
CAB) at 3 [hereinafter cited as It's Working].
"' Address by Marvin Cohen, Aero Club Luncheon, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 28,
1980) (reprinted by CAB) at 4 [hereinafter cited as Address].
For example, in 1978 Hot Springs, Arkansas was served by two local
service carriers which provided 26 DC-9 and 14 Convair flights
weekly. . . . In April 1980 the city received 96 weekly flights with 19
seat Metros. . . . The average travel time was reduced and there was
ample capacity to meet consumer demand. The estimated fuel con-
sumed in serving Hot Springs in 1978 was about 2.5 million gallons. In
1980 it was just under 600,000 gallons. At a dollar a gallon, this higher
quality service saved the industry and consumers $1.9 million dollars.
We have not attempted to figure out the total savings from the substi-
tution of turbo-prop equipment throughout the system, but it is obvi-
ously immense.
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move in smaller community service from jet planes to small
turbo prop planes is indicative of the benefits of deregula-
tion. " ' "Certainly a stringent system of regulation could en-
sure some small cities a continuation of their jet service, but
the service provided would probably not be as good and the
costs to the taxpayer would be very high."11 4
An objection frequently raised by smaller communities to
the CAB's defense of deregulation is that loss of service must
be measured qualitatively as well as quantitatively.' One
commentary critical of the CAB pointed out that "[a]lthough
the, [CAB] has provided elaborate departure statistics in an
attempt to prove that deregulation was a brilliant success, it
has provided no statistics with respect to the corresponding
qualitative loss that many small communities have exper-
ienced." 1 6 Indeed, some of the CAB's own data now shows
that there has been a quantitative loss of service to small
communities. 1 7
The CAB has drawn much criticism from disgruntled small
communities for the way in which it implemented the essen-
tial air services determinations.' A congressman from Cali-
"I Id. at 3. For 35 of the 50 cities that went through the transition from jet service
to turbo-prop service, there was more frequent service on April 1, 1980, than on April
1, 1978. In all cities the available seats were more than adequate to accommodate the
traffic. Id.
11 It's Working, supra note 111, at 3.
See Dempsey, Rise and Fall of Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the
Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 178 n.428 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Demp-
sey]. In many small communities, the replacing commuter airline is willing to replace
the service abandoned by a larger carrier. But, even though the community may still
have as many departures, the service provided may nevertheless be to less convenient
points at less convenient times, at a far less capacity. The service may also be less
satisfactory in terms of safety and dependability. Id.
11 Id.
"7 See notes 165-176 and accompanying text infra.
"8 See Av. DAILY, Oct. 25, 1979, at 294. Commenting on deregulation one year after
implementation, one Californian stated that:
Kern County's experience with deregulation reads like a sequel to
the last days of Pompeii. Robert Ripley would not believe what has
happened here. Since deregulation we have lost our Las Vegas service.
Despite Air Pacific's representations, San Francisco enplanements
have fallen 40% and we are fighting to retain service to Los Angeles,
where United's requested departure would mean a 90% loss in our en-
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fornia asserted that the "economics theorists at the Board
have arrived at a supposed level of self-sufficiency for air
carrier service and have adopted that level as essential air ser-
vice for each community without regard to community needs.
This has given deregulation a negative image in small
communities. '"119
The small communities' assertions that their needs are be-
ing ignored are in direct conflict with the purported policy be-
hind the approach2 0 that the CAB took in making the essen-
tial service determinations."' In fact, the determinations were
not finished for over six months past the statutory deadline, 2
due to the large amount of local input that the Board re-
quested in conjunction with the guidelines for essential service
and the specific determinations that were made for each com-
munity."18 One of the major problems leading to dissatisfac-
tion according to Chairman Cohen is that every community
sees itself as being unique. " The needs of the communities
must be met, but Cohen does not want the agency to knuckle
tire air service prior to deregulation. We are reconsidering our local
ordinance against hitchhiking. We do not oppose deregulation. Rather,
we think CAB erred in its treatment of Bakersfield and take little
comfort from the belated admissions to this effect by the CAB staff.
Id.
"I Id. at 295.
12o See notes 48-55 and accompanying text supra.
"I See Av. DAILY, June 12, 1980, at 237. CAB member George Dailey sees the suc-
cess of deregulation as inevitably linked to the Board's explaining its small commu-
nity program satisfactorily. He stated that a "continuing program of community out-
reach-including personal appearances by board members when necessary, is crucial
to the stability of the essential service program." Id.
"1 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1981). This section states that, "after
considering the views of any interested community and the State agency of the State
in which such community is located" the Board was to have all essential service de-
terminations completed by October 24, 1979. As of April 21, 1980, 90 percent of the
determinations had been made. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 21, 1980, at 25.
"' In explaining why the essential service determinations were going to be delayed,
Chairman Cohen wrote: "[R]ather than develop our guidelines for essential air service
determinations in a vacuum, we elect to hold a series of regional meetings throughout
the country to get the greatest possible input from the states and affected communi-
ties." Letter from Marvin M. Cohen to Howard W. Cannon (Oct. 23, 1979), reprinted
in Av. DAILY, Nov. 5, 1979, at 18.
11" See Av. DAILY, Dec. 17, 1979, at 237.
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under to what he sees as unreasonable community demands:
"If we do just whatever the community wants, I think it will
destroy the program."""
It is clear however, that many communities feel that their
needs are not being met by the essential services program.1 *3
An ad hoc group of United States airport officials is attempt-
ing to gather support for some proposed amendments to the
ADA aimed at tailoring essential services more toward com-
munity needs.1 27 One suggested amendment would redefine
essential air service as the level of service necessary to meet
historic passenger demands including service to hub air-
ports. 12  Another proposed amendment would attempt to in-
clude some protection of point-to-point service of communi-
ties in addition to the provision that an airport or community
be provided with service to a hub operation. The chairman
of the ad hoc group believes that amending the law in Con-
gress is the only way to gain some relief for small and medium
sized communities. 0o
The American Association of Airport Executives has en-
dorsed by resolution the proposed amendments because it be-
lieves the "CAB's current guidelines for essential service are
unresponsive to the air service needs of small and medium
126 Av. DAILY, Nov. 7, 1979, at 33.
ISO See Av. DAILY, Aug. 4, 1980, at 185. Appeals have been filed by 100 of the 560
communities which received essential service determinations, and over fifteen more
appeals are expected. Id.
127 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., April 21, 1980, at 25.
128 Id. This proposed amendment would replace the current 80 seat per day guar-
antee adopted by the CAB, termed "inadequate" by the ad hoc group. Id.
129 Id. This proposed amendment was added in an effort to attract interest of me-
dium sized airport operators whose airports have lost point to point service under
deregulation. Two other amendments that are also being circulated in draft language
by the ad hoc group are: (1) to extend the time in which airlines may exit from air-
ports from 90 days' notice to 18 months' notice for a three-year period, and to twelve
months' notice thereafter; and (2) to require exiting carriers to provide sufficient fuel
to a replacement carrier at a fair market price. Id.
ISo Timothy L. Campbell, Executive Director, Patrick Henry International Airport,
Newport News, Va., who is the chairman of the ad hoc group, stated that after a
meeting last year between a group of airport operators and the CAB staff, "it was
clear that the CAB had no intention to help out." Id.
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sized communities. 31 Other factions of the transportation in-
dustry are becoming concerned as well. In a resolution expres-
sing concern about the decline of air service to small commu-
nities, the American Automobile Association has asked
Congress to instigate oversight hearings to determine if airline
deregulation is achieving its stated goals.132
The most vocal opposition to the essential services determi-
nations has come from several small and medium sized com-
munities in West Virginia that have been hit hard by the ef-
fects of deregulation.13 8 Although the magnitude of the
reduction in services has been much more severe in West Vir-
ginia than anywhere else in the country,3 4 the types of
problems encountered in that state are demonstrative of the
problems encountered by many small communities through-
out the country.3 5 One of the biggest difficulties is selling
commuter airline service to passengers who are used to travel-
ing on the major airlines' jets.' 6 One commuter airline's Pres-
ident remarked that, "[t]he idea is to persuade travelers that
the dark ages of aviation haven't descended just because the
Av. DAILY, June 18, 1980, at 271. The resolution was adopted at the AAAE's
52nd annual conference in Dallas. Id.
2 Av. DAILY, Oct. 21, 1980, at 277. The resolution which was adopted at the AAA's
annual meeting in Atlanta also expressed concern over sharp fare increases and sig-
nificant employee dislocation. Id.
103 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 29. The director of the CAB Office
of Community and Congressional Relations said West Virginia may have lost 35% of
all small community service. Id.
I" See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 30. For example, Parkersburg,
West Virginia which as of July, 1980, had 15 roundtrip market flights daily to various
markets, was guaranteed 2 in its essential service determination. Morgantown had 17
and was guaranteed 4, Clarksburg had 23 and was guaranteed 4, Bluefield had 12 and
was guaranteed 4, and Beckley had 10 daily roundtrips and was guaranteed only 4.
Id.
'" The decrease in number of seats and flights available is part of a nationwide
trend in small community air service. See notes 165-76 and accompanying text infra.
Also, the qualitative loss of service due to a movement from local service to commuter
carriers is a general problem in many markets. See notes 136-47 and accompanying
text infra.
'" See Harris, Commuter Airlines Dress Up to Attract More Pasengers, WALL ST.
J.,Nov. 21, 1980, at 25, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Harris]. Many passengers assume
that the commuter airlines' eight to fifty seat planes are less safe, and flying on them
smacks of second-class citizenship. Id.
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big, deregulated trunk lines have stopped flying jetliners in
many marginal markets."187 The commuter carriers however,
have found this task to be extremely difficult. In West Vir-
ginia, the commuter carrier, Aeromech, Inc. for example, has
tried to take up the slack left by the large carriers by flying
eight commuter planes that are not pressurized and are much
smaller than the major airlines' jets it replaced."" One passen-
ger commented that, "Aeromech works hard to overcome the
commuter airline image and assure its customers the service is
as safe and comfortable as a larger airline. But the aircraft
and service cannot be as comfortable as that provided by a
certificated airline."13 9
The image and service problems of the commuter airlines
are complicated by several factors. First, there are frequent
problems in finding slots and facilities for commuter airlines
in the major cities' terminals.14 0 In West Virginia's case, Aer-
omech's commuter flights from Washington, D.C.'s National
Airport are relegated to a cramped commuter terminal,'14  and
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the commuters do not even have
a terminal. "1 2 Second, Aeromech's flights operate at a much
lower altitude subjecting passengers to much more turbu-
lence.1 43 Even though the passenger is provided with a better
view of the landscape, the tradeoff is often discomforting.1 44
Third, most commuter airline cabins are too small to stand up
37 Id. What the 250 commuter airlines have is a public relations problem. Accord-
ing to Skywest President, Jerry C. Atkin, "it's just in the passengers' head, but it is
there." Id.
1 Bus. WEEK, June 23, 1980, at 63.
" Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 29.
40 See Deregulation Hearings, supra note 107, at VII, 7-8. A number of key air-
ports only have the facilities and capacity to accommodate fewer flights than the de-
mand warrants and are thus slotted or restricted to a maximum number of opera-
tions. Id.
142 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 29.
143 Id. At Pittsburgh, commuter aircraft are parked on a remote apron and passen-
gers are bused to a main terminal. Id.
143 Id. at 29-30.
144 Id. at 30. But see Harris, supra note 136, at 25, col. 5: "[A]s passengers redis-
cover the beauties of the landscape, in contrast to the cloud top boredome of high
flying jets, the commuter operators believe their service will seem even more
attractive."
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in and there are no stewardesses, meals, or amenities.1" Fi-
nally, many commuter aircraft are not pressurized, causing
further discomfort for some passengers.14 These factors all
lead to feelings of nervousness or displeasure which makes re-
placement commuter service hard to promote and, in many
cases, a poor substitute for the small communities that were
guaranteed essential service.4 7
One phenomenon which indicates that essential air service
is not meeting the needs of smaller communities is the re-
sponse of corporations which have increased their investments
in aircraft, in order to assure transportation for their execu-
tives and key personnel to plants and offices in smaller com-
munities where service has been cut. 48 Skyrocketing fares on
the short-haul markets likewise have been a factor in forcing
private industry to purchase its own aircraft.'49 The CAB has
been of little help in trying to keep fares from rising too rap-
idly in these smaller markets. 50 In fact, under an interim pol-
a16 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 30. But see Harris, supra note 136,
at 25, col. 5. Mississippi Valley Airlines, Inc., has recently purchased some larger for-
eign made commuter aircraft that are wide enough to allow them to employ on-board
attendants to carry out its new wine and cheese service. Id.
1'" Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 30. For problems that unpressurized
commuter aircraft cause to retired citizens in New Mexico and Arizona, see Deregula-
tion Hearings, supra note 107, at 32-36.
"'7 See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 30. "Virtually every passenger
talked to during recent commuter airline flights in West Viriginia volunteered that he
was uneasy about the service. At least two said they would not have flown if they had
known they were booked on commuter aircraft." Id.
'40 See WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1980, at 1, col. 5. The National Business Aircraft
Association expects the nation's business aircraft fleet to increase at an average of at
least 5 percent a year for some time to come. They also estimate that 36,000 compa-
nies are currently flying 65,000 aircraft. U.S. airlines fly a total of 2,500 planes. Id.
140 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 30. The Charleston, West Virginia,
airport manager expressed private industries' position this way:
There are some companies that absolutely forbid their employees to
fly on commuter airlines because they think they are being ripped off
by the cost of the ticket, .. and mostly because of the safety aspect.
The businesses have come to the conclusion that they have no choice
but to buy their own airplane because they don't have the airline ser-
vice they need. In some cases four or five small businesses have gone
together to buy an airplane and hire a pilot.
Id. at 31.
" See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1482(e)(1) (West Supp. 1981). This section of the ADA re-
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icy issued in May of 1980, the Board allowed total flexibility
in fare structuring for markets under 200 miles, while setting
ceilings on other markets. " ' This policy was revised approxi-
mately four months later, after the CAB received sharp criti-
cism from several senators for its discrimination against small
communities. 5 2
Besides increasing transportation costs for companies al-
ready doing business in many small communities, the impact
of deregulation is decreasing the attractiveness of locating new
businesses in these communities.' " West Virginia, in its third
year of a $300,000 per year advertising campaign to attract
new business, is extremely concerned because "business looks
at air service as a factor in locating.' '1 5 4 Industries that are not
fully established in small communities are left extremely vul-
nerable"5 when passenger service is drastically reduced. State
and federal funds previously invested to upgrade airport facil-
quires the CAB to accept as reasonable only fares that represent either an increase of
up to 5 percent above the standard industry fare level or a decrease to as little as 50
percent of that level. Furthermore, this deference is only limited to cases where no
single airline carries more than 70 percent of the traffic over the route in question. Id.
§ 1482(d)(4). In light of these congressional requirements it appears discriminatory
for the CAB to allow total fare flexibility on segments under 200 miles while keeping
ceilings on longer routes. For criticism of this policy see Av. DALy, May 21, 1980, at
114.
161 WALL. ST. J., Sept. 25, 1980, at 4, col. 2. Under the interim policy, the CAB had
set a fare flexibility limit of 50 percent for routes of 201-400 miles and 30 percent for
longer routes. When limits were finally put on the short-distance markets, airlines
were allowed to raise those fares $15 plus 30 percent a year above the cost based fare
level that the agency regularly sets. Id.
"' Two of the leading critics were Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Howard
Cannon (D-Nev.), see Av. DAILY, May 15, 1980, at 81, and former Senate majority
leader Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), see Av. DAILY, May 21, 1980, at 114.
" See Dempsey, supra note 115, at 179 n.428. Chambers of Commerce have begun
to worry about their ability to attract new industry and tourism with reduced air
passenger service. Transportation like communications and energy is a fundamental
component of national, regional and local economic development. If any of these vital
components is deficient, either from a qualitative or quantitative standpoint, invest-
ment in industrial plants is not as likely to be forthcoming, and existing industry may
relocate elsewhere. Id.
Bus. WEEK, June 23, 1980, at 64.
16 See Deregulation Hearings, supra note 107, at 67. The mayor of Providence,
Rhode Island, pointed out his city's vulnerability. "You can't go into the convention
business. You can't keep up the jewelry trade which manufactures 66-% percent of
the world's costume jewelry or develop a convention service when Air New England is
your major carrier to New York." Id.
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ities are effectively wasted.15'
The subsidy provisions under section 419 were intended by
Congress to insure that the eligible small communities under
the program actually received the air service determined to be
essential for such communities. 167 Nevertheless, the Board's
emphasis on saving subsidy money whenever possible, instead
of seeing that the service needs of the community are met, is
weakening the effectiveness of the subsidy."58 Because the
Board takes this stance, many small carriers are reluctant to
ask for needed subsidies due to their belief that the Board will
always give the routes to the carrier that does not request
subsidy, regardless of any other factors."' a This practice en-
courages small carriers to gamble to a greater extent in their
financial planning before providing service to the small com-
munities.160 As a result, these small carriers experience a
greater percentage of failures, which has the immediate effect
of further disrupting service.101 According to one state avia-
tion director, "[ijf the Board in its selection process will listen
I" Id. at 6. "Some airlines are deserting many of our airports into which Congress
has poured literally millions of dollars over many years for construction and improve-
ment, often at the urging of these same airlines. And there are many instances in
which the local communities themselves have spent money to upgrade and improve
their airports." Id. (statement of Senator Robert Byrd). An example given by William
Richards, executive director of the West Virginia Aeronautics Commission is that
"West Virginia had just completed a project to upgrade most of its major airports to
handle two-engine and three-engine jet aircraft just before the major airlines that
operate such aircraft began pulling out of the state." Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July
21, 1980, at 31.
'o See Commuter Airlines, supra note 29, at 694-95.
l See Av. DAILY, July 9, 1980, at 44. The State of New Mexico's initial appeal of
its essential services determinations cited "an apparent reluctance by the Board to
subsidize air service, even where a near term subsidy would contribute to the stability
of the carrier and minimize long-term subsidy requirements." Id. In situations where
a replacement carrier is needed to serve a community being exited by an unwilling
carrier, Chairman Cohen has supported a practice of paying a hold-in subsidy to the
unwilling carrier instead of paying an up-front subsidy to an untried commuter. Co-
hen stated that "the Board, heeding public views, did not wish to corrupt commuters,
which have been successful in the unregulated marketplace, by conveying the attitude
that subsidy always would be paid." Av. DAILY, Feb. 6, 1980, at 204.





responsively to the desires of the community, it will, to a large
degree, insure a satisfied, well-served public. Competing appli-
cations to provide service can then be judged by which pro-
vides the best service rather than which is cheapest.'' 1 The
CAB has taken notice of the various communities' desires
when selecting subsidized carriers to provide air service under
section 419, but the small communities' interests are fre-
quently outweighed by the Board's concern'" that the section
419 program will grow into the multi-million dollar operation
the old subsidy program has become.'"
Recent statistics show that quantitatively a majority of
smaller communities are receiving worse service under deregu-
lation. Scheduled departures from non-hubs communities
have decreased steadily since November of 1979 at a much
faster rate than any of the other various classifications of hub
142 Id. at 106 (opinion of Wayne C. Anderson, Director of Aeronautics, Nebraska
Aeronautics Commission).
163 Av. DAILY, Dec. 17, 1979, at 237; Av. DAILY, Feb. 27, 1980, at 333. This concern
of the Board was voiced by Chairman Cohen during hearings on whether to grant
subsidy to Air North or Empire Airlines for service to three communities to upper
New York. Air North had proposed a $345,000 annual subsidy but also the use of
larger aircraft than Empire had proposed to provide at the cost of $99,000-$206,000
annually. The communities' unanimous choice was Air North. Despite a fear of set-
ting an unwise precedent, the Board selected Air North. Id. More recently, the Board
sided with Scheduled Skyways over an untested airline, South Central, for subsidized
service at two Arkansas communities. Despite substantial financial backing and com-
munity support for South Central, the Board picked Scheduled Skyways mainly be-
cause of its lower proposed subsidy. Av. DAILY, Aug. 25, 1980, at 309-10; Av. DAILY,
Sept. 15, 1980, at 75.
'4 In 1980, government payments to airlines are expected to be $86.8 million under
the 406 subsidy program and $9.4 million under the 419 subsidy program. The largest
recipient of 419 subsidy for 1980 will be United Airlines, which is expected to receive
$2.2 million for continuing air service in six markets by order of the CAB. The rate of
return which the carriers are pushing for in 419 subsidies is a 12 percent return on
investment. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 12, 1980, at 22. However, the CAB staff
has been experimenting with a profit based on the carrier's operating expenses. A 10
percent profit based on operating expenses was used as a test with Air Kentucky's
proposed subsidy rate in the London/Corbin-Louisville market. Av. DAILY, April 2,
1980, at 177. As of September 30, 1980, 23 airlines have received subsidy under 419
since it's inception. Almost $8 million has been spent compensating unwilling carriers
for losses incurred while slightly over $1 million has been spent establishing essential
service. Subsidy Paid to Air Carriers under 419 as of September 30, 1980 (unpub-
lished CAB memo).
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cities.'" Of the 526 non-hub communities in the national air
system, 276 experienced fewer departures in July of 1980 than
were occurring in July of 1978, as opposed to 200 non-hubs
which experienced an increase in departures in July 1980
'" See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT ON AIRLINE SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC,
LOAD FACTORS AND MARKET SHARES, SERVICE STATUS ON JULY 1, 1980, 5, 47 (Sept.
1980) [hereinafter cited as CAB Report].
TRENDS IN SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES,
BY HUB SIZE
February 1979-July 1980
Percent Change Over Previous Year I/
Month Nonhubs Small Hubs Medium Hubs Large Hubs Total
Feb. '79 5.2 8.4 10.0 9.1 8.4
Mar. '79 4.6 5.3 11.0 8.7 7.8
Apr. '79 7.2 5.5 11.7 9.7 8.9
May '79 8.4 4.2 10.1 9.2 8.5
June '79 6.8 4.9 9.4 9.6 8.3
July '79 10.4 6.2 9.3 9.2 9.1
Aug. '79 9.3 5.5 8.9 8.8 8.5
Sept.'79 9.8 5.3 5.9 9.0 8.2
Oct. '79 6.0 6.2 7.8 7.7 7.2
Nov. '79 7.2 4.7 6.7 5.5 5.9
Dec. '79 2.3 1.5 5.4 4.9 4.0
Jan. '80 -3.2 -0.6 1.0 2.8 0.8
Feb. '80 -3.6 -2.9 -5.0 0.1 -1.8
Mar. '80 -6.0 -4.8 -5.5 0.1 -2.7
Apr. '80 -7.1 -5.2 -5.8 -1.2 -3.7
May '80 -8.1 -4.5 -5.3 -1.9 -4.1
June '80 -10.5 -3.6 -5.8 -1.? -4.5


















I I . I I
180 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [47
compared to July 1978.1' Comparing July 1, 1979 to July 1,
1980, seventy communities which were receiving some service
I' Id. at 51.
Table 5
AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES BY HUB SIZE
(48 States)






























Source: Official Airline Guide, July 1, 1978 and July 1, 1980.

















181.4 48.2 25.8 5.9 261.3
1-f Including departures to all destinations by all carriers, including
foreign flag.
2/ Airport Activity Statistics, year ended December 31, 1978.













have now lost it,1 7 while only sixteen communities have
167 Id. at 73
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started to receive service in 1980 after being without any ser-
vice in 1979.168
When an analysis is done in terms of seats available to a
community, it becomes evident that even service to cities that
the CAB has used as positive examples of deregulation has
decreased quantitatively. 1 9 In Salem, Oregon, departures are
up 46.3 percent in July, 1980, as opposed to July, 1978, but
the number of seats available has decreased 34.8 percent.' 0 In
Hot Springs, Arkansas, departures have increased 147 per-
cent, but available seats have increased only 1.6 percent.7
These statistics, showing a decrease in the number of depar-
tures and seats available from small communities, do not nec-
essarily indicate that the communities are receiving less effi-
cient service. If average load factors172 had increased since
deregulation, then the service now provided would be more
efficient. The average load factors, however, have decreased on
flights serving non-hub markets since the implementation of
deregulation, 7 s which proves that smaller communities are
receiving markedly worse air service than existed prior to der-
egulation. The CAB argues that the recession and rising fuel
costs are the causes behind the decline in service.'7 4 This ar-
I ld. at 74.
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16 Chairman Cohen has used Waco, Texas and Salem, Oregon as examples of com-
munities that have been pleased with their commuter service. See A Study in Transi-
tion, supra note 110, at 699. Hot Springs, Arkansas, has also been highlighted by
Cohen. See Address, supra note 112, at 4.
170 CAB Report, supra note 165, at 80.
71 Id. at 77.
"' See note 63 supra for a definition of average load factor.
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gument, however, would account only for average load factor
decreases that are proportionate to those that have occurred
in larger markets. 17 5 In fact, the average load factors on non-
hub routes have decreased at a much greater proportion than
the other routes in the air transportation system.176
IV. Conclusion
It is evident that, due to deregulation, air service to small
communities has decreased both qualitatively177 and quantita-
tively.178 In view of this decrease, it is difficult to say that the
needs of these smaller communities have been adequately pro-
tected by the CAB. Essential service determinations can and
should be upgraded when appealed to the Board, if the eco-
nomic viability of the affected community will otherwise suf-
fer.17' The section 419 subsidies should be used to insure com-
fortable, convenient, and consistent air service by smaller
airlines that are providing the replacement service to these
communities.16 0
After two years of functioning in a deregulated environ-
ment, it is apparent that the airline industry will continue to
need some form of regulation ' in order to insure that smaller
communities receive a quality of air service necessary to foster
their economic growth.182
1,4 See Address, supra note 112, at 1.
"' For the average load factor decreases in larger markets see CAB Reports, supra
note 165, at 103. Theoretically, recessionary factors should have an equal effect on all
markets.
176 Id.
17 See notes 136-47 and accompanying text supra.
178 See notes 165-76 and accompanying text supra.
"I See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 21, 1980, at 31. A lack of adequate air ser-
vice stunts community growth creating a viscious circle in which a city does not grow
enough to justify adequate air service. The reason the community does not grow is
because it does not have adequate air service. Id.
I See Deregulation Hearings, supra note 107, at 64 (remarks of Vincent Cianci,
Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island). "[T]he implementation of the Deregulation Act,
without a suitable compensatory modification of the definition of essential air services
to ensure comfortable and convenient air service by major carriers, will most certainly
destroy the whole commercial and industrial expansion of medium sized cities." Id.
'"1 See Av. DAILY, Oct. 31, 1980, at 342. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith
predicts that some form of the CAB will return in the future because regulation of
the airline industry cannot be avoided. Id.
'91 See Dempsey, supra note 115, at 179, n.428.
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Clearly there is more at stake than the sanctity of the mar-
ketplace. There is a public interest in assuring that the funda-
mental ingredients of economic growth are abundent in all re-
gions of our nation, so that the fruits of such growth might be
enjoyed by a larger segment of the population.'.
Under section 419; the CAB has the authority to make sure
that small communities are not harmed by deregulation. 1"
However, if the concerns of many of the small communities
continue to be effectively ignored, new legislation will have to
be implemented to insure that the air service needs of these
communities are met.18
183 Id.
384 See notes 49-53, 95-102 and accompanying text supra.
38 See Deregulation Hearings, supra note 107, at 117 (Statement of Senator
George McGovern).





A WIND sways the pines,And below
Not a breath of wild air;
Still as the mosses that glow
On the flooring and over the lines
Of the roots here and there.
The pine-tree drops its dead;
They are quiet, as under the sea.
Overhead, overhead
Rushes life in a race,
As the clouds the clouds chase;
And we go,
And we drop like the fruits of the tree,
Even we,
Even so.
Dirge in Woods by George Meredith

